The promise of data science is that if data from a system can be recorded and understood then this understanding can potentially be utilized to improve the system. Behavioral and economic data, however, is different from scientific data in that it is subjective to the system. Behavior changes when the system changes, and to predict behavior for any given system change or to optimize over system changes, the behavioral model that generates the data must be inferred from the data. The ease with which this inference can be performed generally also depends on the system. Trivially, a system that ignores behavior does not admit any inference of a behavior generating model that can be used to predict behavior in a system that is responsive to behavior. To realize the promise of data science in economic systems, a theory for the design of such systems must also incorporate the desired inference properties.
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Consider as an example the revenue-maximizing auctioneer. If the auctioneer has knowledge of the distribution of bidder values then she can run the first-price auction with a reserve price that is tuned to the distribution. Under some mild distributional assumptions, with the appropriate reserve price the first-price auction is revenue optimal [Myerson 1981] . Notice that the historical bid data for the first-price auction with a reserve price will in most cases not have bids for bidders whose values are below the reserve. Therefore, there is no data analysis that the auctioneer can perform that will enable properties of the distribution of bidder values below the reserve price to be inferred. It could be, nonetheless, that over time the population of potential bidders evolves and the optimal reserve price lowers. This change could go completely unnoticed in the auctioneer's data. The two main tools for optimizing revenue in an auction are reserve prices (as above) and ironing. Both of these tools cause pooling behavior (i.e., bidders with distinct values take the same action) and economic inference cannot thereafter differentiate these pooled bidders. In order to maintain the distributional knowledge necessary to be able to run a good auction in the long term, the auctioneer must sacrifice the short-term revenue by running a non-revenue-optimal auction.
We consider the following auction and bidding model. The auction design space is given by a position auction environment and either first-price or all-pay semantics. There are n agents and n positions and each position has a corresponding service probability. We restrict attention to a class of rank-based auctions wherein the auctioneer A full version of this abstract can be found at http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.5971. This work is supported by NSF grants CCF-1101429, CCF-1101717, and CCF-1101706. Authors' addresses: S. Chawla, Computer Sciences Department, University of Wisconsin -Madison; email: shuchi@cs.wisc.edu; J. Hartline, EECS Department, Northwestern University; email: hartline@eecs.northwestern.edu; D. Nekipelov, Economics Department, University of California -Berkeley; email: denis@berkeley.edu. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage, and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). may modify the position weights by moving service probability from high positions to low positions (or discarding) and then runs a rank-by-bid position auction on the modified position weights. The bidders are single-dimensional with private values drawn independently and identically from a common prior distribution, have linear utility given by their value for service received minus any payment made, and bid in BayesNash equilibrium (i.e., the model of classical auction theory). This model is complex enough to stress-test our ability to do good inference; from Hartline and Yan [2011] for example, simply learning a good reserve price cannot obtain an expected revenue better than a logarithmic factor of optimal in the worst-case. The goal of this work is to develop a theory for the design of mechanisms that perform well in terms of revenue and inference. The motivating story that the theory should resolve is that of a revenue-maximizing auctioneer continuously adapting an auction in a slowly changing world. As the distribution of agent preferences evolves, the equilibrium behavior evolves, and the designer observes behavior and adapts the mechanism.
Our main results are as follows.
(1) We show how to estimate the revenue of a mechanism M 1 using bids drawn from another mechanism M 2 . The error in estimation depends on the supremum and infimum of the derivative of the allocation function of M 2 , as well as the ratio of the derivatives of the two mechanisms' allocation functions. These bounds are especially useful for estimating the multi-unit auction revenue from the revenue of any rank-based auction (see (3)). (2) We prove that rank-based auctions are close to optimal for revenue: they achieve a 4-approximation to the optimal revenue for every value distribution. Further, optimizing for revenue over the class of rank-based auctions requires knowing only n parameters, specifically, the revenues of k-unit auctions for every k in {1, . . . , n}. These multi-unit revenues are a discrete analog to the revenue curve from which revenue optimal auctions are derived [Myerson 1981 ]. (3) As a consequence of (1), we can estimate the n multi-unit revenues with small error whenever M 2 is a rank-based mechanism with a minimum position increment (a.k.a. difference in consecutive position weights). (4) The theory of optimal rank-based auctions mirrors the theory of optimal auctions and is isomorphic to the theory of optimal envy-free pricings of Hartline and Yan [2011] . Given the multi-unit revenues, we can find the optimal rank-based mechanism with or without a constraint on the position increment. A lower bound of /n on the position increment hurts revenue by at most a 1 − factor relative to the optimal rank-based mechanism. (5) Using the approach in (1) to directly estimate the value (and therefore, the revenue curve) at a particular quantile q using bids drawn from a mechanism M 2 leads to an unbounded error in estimation. We describe a more direct approach for estimating values. The error in estimation depends on the infimum and supremum of the derivative of the allocation function of M 2 around the quantile q. (6) The convergence rate in terms of the number of bid samples for the estimate of the revenue curve at a given quantile q using the approach in (5) is slower than that for the estimate of a multi-unit revenue using the approach in (1). The convergence rate will be even slower if the goal is to estimate the entire revenue curve with a uniform error bound. (7) The error bounds in all cases are larger for mechanisms M 2 with all-pay semantics than for mechanisms with first-price semantics (with the same allocation rule).
